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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HAv\TAIIAN EQUIPMENT COMPANY, 
LIMITED, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS. 
THE EIM,CO CORPORATION, a 
corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMEN·T OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
7188 
~ This is an action to recover damages for the refusal 
.i of defendant to accept and pay for eertain personal prop-
erty alleged by plaintiff to have been sold to defendant. 
The pertinent allegations of the complaint are: 
'' 2. That plaintiff and defendant entered 
into an agreement in writing as follows: That 
on or about August 8, 1946, the defendant of-
fered and agreed to purchase from plaintiff, and 
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2 
on \)r about ~\ugus~t 9, 1946, the plaintiff accept~d 
said offer and agreed to sell to defendan~-, cert~In 
goods known and designated a.s pn.eunvattc ~eal1ng 
ha1n1ners and chipping hammers for the price and 
upon the tern1s and conditions hereinafter alleged. 
(Italics ours) 
''3. That the quantity and description of 
said scaling ham1ners and chipping hammers, 
\Yhich defendant agreed to purchase from plain-
tiff, as aforesaid, are as follows: 
Sealing Hamm·ers 
Mokel K-1 Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
Model FC 'Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 
Model MM Independent Pneumatic Tool Co. 
Model "Super" Keller ·Co. 
Model A Dallet Co. 
Total 
Chipping Hantmers 
Model # 2 Master Pneumatic Tool Co. 
Model # 2 Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co. 
Model #200 Ingersoll-Rand Co. 
Model #2 Keller Co. 
Total 
''4. That defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 
for each of said scaling hammers the sum of 
Seventeen Dollars and Fif:ty Cents ($17.50), and 
for each of said chipping hammers the sum of 
Twenty-four Dollars ($2·4.00), f.o.b. Honolulu 
Hawaii, making a total purchase price of Fifty~ 
five Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-thre-e 
Dollars and Fifty Cents ($'55,853.'50), which de-
fendant agreed to pay plaintiff for said goods.'' 
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It i~ alleged that defendant repudiated ~aid agree-
nlent and refused to accept said goods, and plaintiff 
claimed as danta.ges the difference bet,veen the price it 
is alleged defendant agreed to pay and the an1ount plain-
tiff 'Yas ab1le to realize fron1 the sale of said goods to 
other persons. Defendant ans,Yered "ith a general denial, 
a plea of the ~tatute of f"'rauds, and also ~et up seYera] 
~pecial defenses not necessary to be considered. 
Prior to sending said cablegrams, appellant had 
certain telephone conversations 'vith resp-ondent to the 
effect that the lTnited States Government 'vas offering 
for sale in Honolulu certain surplus tools consisting of 
pneumatic chipping hammers and scaling hammers. Ac-
eording to appeUant's evidence, respondent represented 
that ninety per cent of said tools 'vere of Ingersoll-Rand 
manufacture (Rec. p. 233), and app,ellant indicated it 
\Yas interested in these tools at fifty-five per cent of 
government costs (Rec. 105, 234-5) and promised to cable 
a bid (Rec. 234). "Exhibit A'' was thereup.on trans-
n1i tted. It reads : 
''Reference hammers bid maximun1 24 do1lars 
each scalers $17.50 each Honolulu. Will take all.'' 
Appellant intended by said cablegram that respond-
ent should make a bid to the government for said ham-
mers at not to exceed the maximum prices designated 
(Rec. 234-235 and 260), but respondent claims that said 
cablegram was an offer to buy from resp,ondent. The 
result of such divergent understanding of the purport of 
said cablegram will appear in our argument. 
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4 
There was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. 
This appeal is from said judgn1ent. 
ASSIGNl\IENT 'OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in overruling appellant's objection 
I 
to the introduction in evidence of ''Exhibit A.'' (Rec. 
p. 85). 
2. The court erred in overruling appellant's objection 
to the introduction in evidence of "Exhibit B." (Rec. 
p. 86). 
3. The court erred in overruling appellant's objection 
to the introduction in evidence of ''Exhibit C.:' (Rec. 
p. 86). 
4. The court erred in overruling appellant's obj·ection 
to the introduction in evidence of ''Exhibit D.'' (Rec. 
p. 89). 
5. The court erred in r~fusing to grant appel~ant's mo-
tion for a directed verdict. (Rec. p. 326). 
6. The court erred in overruling appellant's motion for 
new trial. (Rec. p. 62). 
ARGUMENT 
According to the foregoing allegations of the com-
plaint, there was an offer by the ap~p~ellant and an ,acoept-
anoe by the respondent which constituted the written 
oo·n.tract, 'vhereby appellant agreed to buy cerrt·ain speci-
fied qu·antiti,es iof oertailn n~odels' of certla:im make.s olf scal-
ing hammers and oertain specif~e~d qwantit:ie:s, models arnd 
1nakes ~of chipping hammers. That is the contract alleged 
to have been entered into, and as the value of the goods 
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5 
'vas up""ards of $500.00, and as no part of the goods was 
accepted, it is. of cour~e, a contraet • • son1c ~note 01r ~nte'ln­
o randunt · · of "yhich i~ required to be in writing under 
Section 81-1-4 Utah Code Annotated. Under said statute, 
such • · n1ote or 1nenrorandu1n in 1oritin.g .of the con,tract'' 
n1ust be · · si.gne-d by the party to be rhargecl,-in this case 
the appellant. 
The only· 'vriting required or that is competent, as 
a con1pliance 'vith said statute is one ''signed by the 
party to b·e cha.rged,'' and although it may he alleged 
that the contract bet,veen the parties is ''in writing'' any 
'vrit.ing signed by the party not sought to be charged 
can be entirely disregarded as immaterial in defining the 
tern1s or conditions of the contract. Its. only significa.nc.e, 
anrl the only effecit it can have (assuming it to be formal-
ly sufficient) is to operate a.s an acceptance of the terms 
and conditions of the offerer as contained in the ''mem-
orandum'' signed by him. 
In Bailey r. Lei.shn~an, 32 Utah 123, 89 Pac. 78, it is 
held that under an allegation that the contract was in 
u·riting, the acceptance could be shown by parol because 
the'' 1nenl.oranclum in u~riting of the contract * * * signed 
by th.e party vo b.e charg.ed'' is the partic.ular writing 
which must embody all the terms of the contract. 
See also 27 C.J. p. 277, Sec. 334 and cases cited. 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN ~DMITTING IN 
E\IIDENCE "EXHIBIT A." (Rec. 85.) 
The contract relied on being within the statute of 
frauds, all its terms must be contained in tbe "m~emorandum 
in writing of the contract" signed by "the party to be 
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charged" and the statem•ent of tbe terms must be co~plete, 
d~efinite and certain. "Exhibit A" (the offer) is ambtgu~us 
and is too uncertain and ·indefinite to m·eet these require-
ments. 
Said ''Exhibit A'' is in words and figures as fol-
lows: 
''Reference hammers bid 1naximum 24 dollars 
each scalers 17.50 each Honolulu. Will take all. 
(a) It contains no statement of either the quanti-
ties, kinds, n1odel or makes of either kind of hammers as 
alleged in the complaint or at al1, and particularly no 
statement that they were to he ''pneumatic'' scaling ham-
mers or ''chipping'' hammers. The description of the 
property is so incomplete and inadequate that it could 
not possibly be identified without parol evidence. 
(h) The words "Will take all" are ambiguous and 
uncertain. They might mean'' all plaintiff had in stock'' 
or '' al1 plaintiff could buy'' or ''all plaintiff might elect 
to sell.'' Therefore, the quantity or number of either 
kind of hammer is· uncertain and could be made certain 
only by parol. 
(c) The words ''bid maximum'' do not import an 
offer to buy. The only reasonable- meaning of such words 
is that of an instruction or authorization to make bids 
on behalf of the sender of the cablegram. Does th·e word 
"bid" ordinarily mean "of£er~'' If so, it cannot well be 
given that meaning when used in connection with the 
word ''maximum.'' How can these .words he construed 
as an offer by appellant to bwy for 24 dollars and 1'7.50 
respective1y~ The statement of an "offer" to buy must 
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h~ so clea.rly expressed as to exclude any other construc-
tion. It 1nust not be subject to construction as an auth-
orization of respondent to bid on behalf of appellant for 
property offered for sale by the surplus property ag·ency 
of the govern1nent. ''Exhibit A'' does not meet this test. 
T·he phrase '"bid maximun1'' bears no other reasonable 
construction than that it authorized r-espondent to bid 
on behalf of appellant and to obtain the prop~erty (not 
specifically identified) as cheaply as possible, but in 
no event to bid above the maximum prices stated. Ap·pe1-
lant did not cable '~,ve bid 24 dollars each sealers 17.50 
each.'' It cabled ''bid maximum.'' Why use the word 
"maximun1 if appellant was making an offer to re-
spondent~ The "~ord ''maximum'' cannot be disregarded. 
This is a co1n1nercial transaction bet,veen traders and it 
is a \\"ell established rule that in construing this class of 
contracts every word must be taken into account. 
In ·!\'rational Bank of Com1nerce v. Lamb-orn, (C.C.A. 
4th Ct. 1~)24) 2 Fed. ( 2d) p. 23, the buyer bought a 
quantity of sugar under a contract which contained this 
term, "shipment to he made"" * *from Java by steamer 
or steamers to Philade1phia.'' The sugar was loaded on 
a vessel hound for Philadelphia. It developed engine 
trouble w· hereupon another vessel containing the same 
quality and quantity of sugar loaded at Java and des-
tined for N e\Y York was diverted by the selleT to Phila-
delphia, and there tendered to t~e buyer within the time 
stipulated by the contract. The buyer refused acceptance. 
The court said : 
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8 
"It is a 1nercantile contract, and 1nerchants 
are not in the habit of placing in their contracts 
stipulation~ to which they do not attach some 
value and importance.'~ 
Further in the opinion the court again says : 
'' \V e in the past have had mor·e than one 
occasion to hold that in mercanti~e contracts the 
courts 1nust give effect to every term in the bar-
gain the parties have chosen to make, and are 
'not at liberty to speculate whether they did or 
did not attach importance to something they 
'vrote. As, for example, in The Mahattan, 284 F. 
310, we accepted as settled law that a purchaser 
of grain to be shipped by one ship could not be 
required to take it if it c.ame in another, and that 
've could not inquire whether every possible pur-
pose of the buyer would not be as well served by 
that 'vhich was brought in the substitute. From 
1nneh which was said by the tribunals which hav·e 
heretofore passed upon 1he obligation of buyers 
to aecept sugar from the. vVest Cheswald, it would 
seem that it is at least possib1e that their con-
clusions were influeneed not a little by their nat-
tural desire to prevent purchasers on a rapidly 
falling market from escaping from a had bargain, 
by taking advantage of a veriation from the ter1ns 
for which they in fact cared nothing. Such con-
siderations have much less weight in construing 
and enforcing the agreements of business men 
than the courts may properly give to them when 
they are called upon to deal with contracts of a 
less strictly mercantile character. In this respect 
we can add nothing to what has been so forcibly 
said in the quotations made from Mr. Justice 
Gray in this country and from Lords ·Cairns and 
Blackburn in England. Our examination of the 
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9 
cases \vhich in this country and across the wa,ter 
have put a definite interpretation on the mean-
ing of the "Tord. "ship1nent,' as used in contracts 
of the rharacter of that \Yith w·hich \Ye are here 
concerned, has convinced us that the instant case 
is not distinguishable from then1, and is governed 
by 'vhat the Supreme Court there said." 
The court in that rase, anticipating that at first 
blush. since the sugar \vas the same as to quality and 
quantity, the ru'ling n1ight appear strained, offered this 
illustration in order to demonstrate the danger of specu-
lating as to 'vhether a given term used in a mercantile 
contract 1nay be dee1ned to be 1nat.erial or not: Suppose, 
said the court, the buyer had insured his shipment against 
loss of profits, 'vould a policy of insurance covering a 
ship1nent of sugar loaded on a vessel from Java destined 
for . Philadelphia be good on a similar shipment loaded 
on another vessel from Java destined for New York and 
diverted to Philade'lphia ~ There was no insurance on the 
ship1nent in this ease, but the court only used the illus-
tration for the purpose of demonstrating that terms em-
ployed in a mercantile contract must be given effect 
\vithout speculation as to whether the merchants em-
ploying the terms deemed them to be material or not. 
In vflaggoner Refining Co. v. Bell Oil & Ga.s Co., 
(Okla.) 244 Pac. 756, the buyer ordered a number of 
tank cars of gasoline, and in the printed portion of the 
purchase order it was recited that the seller in fi'lling 
~hipping orders should show the buyer as the shipper, 
There \vas testimony· that the parties did not treat this 
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tern1 as n1aterial and that it w'as disregarded in prtor 
shipments. The court said: 
''This is what is denominated as: a mercan-
. tile contract, and courts are not permitted ~o 
speculate as 'to the meaning of terms employed In 
such contract, nor to attempt to determine why 
certain terms are used; and the courts are bound 
to give effect to the. terms which the parties have 
chosen for themselves. Filley v. Pope, 6 S. Ct. 
19, 115 U. S. 213, 29 L. Ed. 372. 
''As said by the court in the case of National 
Bank of Commerce v. Lamborn et al. (CCA) 2 
F. (2d) 23, 36 ALR 509: 
'' 'In construing mercantile contracts, courts 
n1ust give effect to every term, and are not at 
liberty to speculate whether the parties did or 
did not attach importance thereto'." 
It follows that the court must give effect to the word 
''maximum;'' and when it does, the only construction 
possible is that instead of the cable being an offer to 
buy, it is in effect an authorization by appellant to re-
spondent for the latter, as agent, to submit a bid to the 
Surplus Property Office, Which ''bid'' should not exceed 
the maximum price stated in the defendant's cable. 
But should 've assume that the 'vords or terms used 
in a "memorandum" are subject to more than one mean-
ing, said ''memorandum'' is, by as strong a reason and 
because of such ambiguity, insufficient as the basis for 
a contract. As we have p~reviously stated, the statement 
of an ''offer to buy'' must be so clearly ·eXp·ressed as. to 
exclude any other construction. 'The memorandum is in-
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11 
sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds unless the 
'~offer·' is an offer to buy to the exclusion of an offer to 
enter into any other relationship. The ''memorandum'' 
is insufficient if the offer is a1nbiguous and can be in-
terpreted as \\~ell to be an instruction to an agent to 
n1ake a bid to so1neone else. The follo\\''ing two authori-
ties so hold: 
In l{errin v. Biglane, (1fiss.) 110 So. 232, the written 
n1en1oranduin ,,~as as follows : 
''For the consideration of one dollar ( $1.00) 
I hereby give 0. J. Biglane option on Lots 1 and 
2." 
Says the court: 
"'It is perfectly manifest to us. that rit can-
not he said fron1 a close scrutiny of this pap·er 
whether it is a contract to lease, to sell, or to pur-
rhase, and, if to lease, the time of the beginning 
and end of 1he lease contract is not therein shown; 
in other 'vords, the paper is so indefinite, so vague 
-and uncertain that no one can tell what was in-
tended to be done by the parties at the time of its 
execution. Our court is committed to the doctrine 
announced in Waul v. Kirkman, 27 Miss. 823, 
'"'herein Mr. Justice Handy, as the organ of the 
court, said : 
'' 'The rule upon this point is 'veil settled to 
be that the memorandum, in order to satisfy the 
statute,. must contain the substantial terms of 
the contract express-ed with such certainty that 
they may be understood from the contract itself, 
or some other writing to which it refers, without 
resorting to parol evidence. Boydel1 v. Drummond, 
11 Ea~t 143 (and other authorities.) For other-
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\Vise all the danger of perjury, intended to ~e 
guarded against by the statute, would be let In. 
And \vhen reference is made in the memorandu1n 
to another writing, it must be so clear as t~ pre-
vent the possibility of the paper being substituted 
for another. L. Sug. Vend., 94; Smith v. Arnold, 
3 ~Iason (U.S.) 416, Fed. Cas. No. 13,004.' 
"Under the above-quoted rule, it certainly is 
a n1ost essential element that the contract state 
or sho\v in some manner whether it is a contract 
to s·ell or not, and whether a warranty deed or 
quitclaim deed was to be executed or not. These 
are just as essential e1ements as the purchase 
price. 
''The bill herein undertakes to explain and 
supply these very essential elements of the con-
tract, but the instrument itself is so uncertain as 
to be absolutely void, because, by no stretch of 
construction, from any language in the paper, can 
it he said that it is an offer to sell." 
In Osborne v. Moorie, (Tex.) 247 S. W. 498, the plain-
tiff offered in evidence a check for $100 on which there 
was entered the following memorandum: 
''To bind deal on · one block and six room 
house on North Oak Street.'' 
The defendant objected to the introduction of the check 
on the ground that the word ''deal'' might mean a pur-
chase and sale, or it might mean a transaction of some 
other character. Says the court: 
''A 'deal' betw·een two parties includes any 
transaction of any kind between them and when 
applied to a transaction concerning a house or 
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block does not in1ply an a.greetnent to sell or con-
vey the san1e, and an endorsement on a check 'to 
bind deal' in relation thereto may refer to an 
agreement to sell or convey or it may refer to an 
entirely different kind of transaction, as an agree-
Inent to rent or lease the property. 
''The promise to sell or convey being an im· 
portant element of a contract, parol evidence i~ 
not adtnissible to prove it as the real kind or 
character of the transaction actua1ly agreed on 
by the parties.'' 
In fVilliston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., \; ol. II, p. 1645, 
Sec. 575, the author says: 
''The property to which a sale, or contract to 
sell, rela·tes must be described in the memorandum 
with reasonable certainty. So, although the con-
tract appearing in the memorandum seems to be 
complete upon its fact, if, in fact, there were ad-
ditional terms, the memorandum is insufficient 
because the memorandum must s~tate the essential 
tern1s of the oral con tract." 
and in Sec. 578, p. 1656, the author states: 
''The same kind of question arises in regard 
to a description of the goods sold. They must 
be sufficiently described for reasonable identifi-
cation. A distinction should be noticed between 
sales or contracts to sell epecific goods, and con-
tracts to se1ll goods of a certain kind. In a con-
tract of the latter sort, a ·memorandum need be 
no more definite than the contract. If the contract 
is definite enough to be enforced, a memor~ndum 
'vhich states the contract as it was made ~ill be 
sufficient, while, on the other hand, if the memor-
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andlnn is more general than the actual contra~t, 
the memorandum, though seeming good on _Its 
face wil be insufficient because not fully s\tat1ng 
the ~ontract the. parties made. WhJe,re, how·ever, 
the s·ale or contrac.t 1'"e~ates t.o sp·eC'ific property, 
there can be no question about lack of definiteness 
in the contract iis·elf so far as concerns the prop-
erty to which the bargain relates; the question is 
- wholly whether the memorandum sufficiently de-
scribes this property." (Ita~ics· ours.) 
"Exhibit A" is manifestly insufficient as a "mem-
orandum in writing of the contract" in view of its 
uncertanty and in view of its ambiguity (if it can possibly 
be con~trued as an offer to buy) and when it is so com-
pletely lacking in a statement of all the terms of the 
particular contract alleged in the complaint or of any 
contract. 
The deficiencies and uncertainties in ."Exhibit A" 
cannot be cured, nor can the provisions of said exhibit be 
supplem·ented either by "Exhibit B" or by paro'l. 
In Lewis v. Elliott Bay Logging Company, (Wash.) 
191 Pac. 803, the seller wrote : 
"We let you have fir at $7-10-13 delivered 
Everett or Seattle.'' 
The buyer replied : 
' 'Your letter of the twenty -sixth instant is re-
ceived in which you agree to let me ha¥e the raft 
of fir logs, to be delivered in Seattle, by you at 
$7 .00, $10.00, and $13.00, * * * and I will take the 
.. fir logs as per your offer at the. above prices.'' 
Held no contract; that the acceptance in specifying'' raft 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
of fir logs'' could not render certain what was uncertain 
in the offer. Says the court: 
"The first question to be determined is 
"~hether the letters referred to constitute a suf-
ficient n1en1orandun1 to satisfy the statute of 
frauds. One of the essentials of a memoranduin 
under the statute is that it shall designate the sub-
ject tna tter of the contract. 
''Considering, first, the letter signed by the 
appellant, there is no designation therein of the 
quantity, but the subject of the sale is reffered to 
simply as 'fir.' The rule as stated in 1 Mechem 
on Sales, Sec. 437, is that-
.' 'rrhe note or memorandum must also shO\V 
\Yhat goods 'vere sold and in what quantities. This 
rule requires that the goods shall be set out either 
by name or by such description as will enable them 
to be ascertained without other recourse to parol 
evidence to identify the goods or apply the de-
seription of them.' 
'' ( 1) Under this rule it is neeessary that the 
note or memorandum show in 'what quantities' the 
goods are sold. In 25 R. C. L. 648, the ru'le is stated 
substantially the same as in Mechem, and is as 
follows: 
'' 'In case of contracts for the sale of goods 
the memorandum must designate with reasonable 
certainty the subject matter of the sale, and where 
the sale is of a quantity of a commodity the 
quantity must be stated with reasonable certainty 
as well as its kind.' 
'' ( 2, 3) This ·rule requires that the quantity 
be designated in the memorandum. The letter 
'vri tten by the appellant, which referred to the 
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subject rna tter of the sal~ as 'fir,' did not suf ... 
ficien·t~y designate the quantity. The respondent, 
ho\vever, argues that the two letters should be con-
sidered together. It is true that where the m-em-
o.randu.nt consists of telegrams or letters they may 
be construed together, providing they are suf-
ficiently connected by reference. In the letter of 
the respondent the quantity of the subject matter, 
namely, 'a ra£t of fir logs,' is for the first time 
designated. Under the authoritie! above cited this 
was one of the essentials of the m·emorandum. 
'' ( 4) The question then arise, the memoran-
dum of the appellant by which it is sought to be 
charged not sufficiently describing the subject 
matter, can it be held upon the letter of the re-
spondent which for the first time contains that es-
sential term of the contract~ Respondent cites a 
nun1ber of cases upon this question, all of which 
have been carefully read rand considered, but nonP 
of them would sustain a holding that the appel-
lant could he charged upon a memorandum which 
it did not sign, and 'vhich designated the quantity, 
where the writing signed by the appellant did 
not sufficiently designate the subject matter in 
that respect. '' 
The rule i~ thus stated in 17 C.J.S. p·. 364: 
. ' 'It is essential to a con tract that the nature 
and extent of the obligation be certain. If an agree-
ment is uncertain, it is beoau.se the ;offier was un-
certain o·r ambiguous to b.egin w·ith, for the ac-
ceptance is always required to be identical with 
the offer or there is no meeting of minds and no 
agreement. If the p·erson to whom the offer is 
made sees the uncertainty and p-roposes a change 
which will .make the agreement certain, this puts 
an end to the offer.'' (Italics ours.) 
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In 1Vorthhei;ner r. /{linger Jiills, (Ind.) 2:> N. E. 
(2d) 246, the plaintiff alleg·ed the contract to be in writ-
ing consisting of t".,.o letters "~hereby defendant agreed 
to se'll certain tin1othy and clover seed, which it is alleged 
defendant failed to deliver. The 1nen1orandum (letters) 
relied on, desc.ribed the seed as '' 100 Bags Full Timothy 
1.50 per bu. 4 Bags White Blossom S. Clover 3.20 per 
bu.'' etc., but the letters did not state the number of 
bushels per bag, and there was no allegation or proof 
that under trade usages a bag c.ontained any particular 
nun1ber of bushels. Held the offer was insufficient and 
that parol evidence could not be admitted to comp~ete the 
contract b~.,. supplying the on1issio:n. 
In Stanley r. A. Levy & J. Zentner Company, (Nev.) 
112 Pac. (2d) 1047: 158 A.L.R. 76, the memorandum re-
lied on signed by defendant was as follows: 
"In reference to the purchase of International 
truck by B. F. Stanley of the city of Reno, \Ve can 
assure you that he wi~l have the hauling of 600 
tons of wine grapes, the proceeds to be paid to you, 
less $700 allowance for Mr. Stanley's operating 
expenses. For your information Mr. Stanley will 
be paid at the rate of $6 a ton.'' 
Held insufficient, in not stating whether the weight of 
the grapes transported would be computed. on the net 
weight or on the gross weight of the grapes and contain-
ers, and that parol evidence was not admissible to over-
come the uncertainty. Says the court: 
''The question is as to its sufficiency as a 
note or memorandum to prevent the interposition 
of the statute. It is the consensus of judicial 
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opinion that··'such writing must contain all the 
essential ele1nents of; the· contract~ ·The substan-
tial parts ·of the contract 1nust be em~odied in 
the· writing with such a degre·e of certainty as to 
rriake~clear and definite the intention -of the parties 
withou,t r'e.sort to oral evid.enQe. ·Manufacturer's 
Light &·Heat Co. v. Lamp et al, 269 P. 517, 112 
4-. 679; Seyrp.our v. O-elrichs, 156 Ca'l. 782, 106 
P .. 88, 134Am. St. Rep. 154; 1\fentz v. Newwitter, 
···122· N.Y. 491, 25 N.E. 1044, 11 L.R.A.-97, 19 Ain . 
. St. Rep. 514; Snow v. Nelson, C.C., 113 F. 353; 
,~5 O~J.· Sec~ 318; 25. R.C.L. 645, Sec. 276; 2 Wil-
liston on Contrac_ts, Re.v. Ed. 1619, 1622. 
''The following forn1ula is stated in Restatement of 
La'v Contrac:ts·, Sec. 207: 
( ~:· • I • ' I ' 
; ~ . '' 'A niemor.andum, in orJ.er to make enforce-
, able a contract wirthin the statute, may be any 
docum·ent or writing, formal or informal, signed 
by the party to be charged-or by his agent actually 
or apparently authoriz-ed thereunto, which states 
with reasonable certainty, (a) eac:h party to ·the 
contFact either by . his own name, or by such a 
description ~s will serv·e to identify him, or by 
the na~e or description of his agent, and (b) the 
land, goods or other subject-mater to which the 
contract relates, and (c) the terms and conditions 
of all the. promises constituting the contract and 
.. · by whom and to whom the promis~es are made.' 
·' :: ''Tested by the ru1e· stated it will be seen that 
the: letter is deficient in .several respHcts. For in-
, stance, it is all·ege~ in the complaint and p~lain­
tiff sought to prove, that the weight of the grap.es 
tra.nsported would he· computed upon ~the gross 
weight :of the ~grapes and boxes or their containers. 
T·his· ·was contradicted by defendant, and Watt 
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testified that the $6 per ton. :was to be paid on the 
net "~eight. Whether it was to be net or gross 
would have considerable bearing on, the profits 
and 'vas an essential elen1ent of which no mention 
is rnade in the letter. • * * We hold that the letter 
in this case does not take the agreement out of the 
statute of frauds.'' 
In Elli~ r. Denrer L. & G. R. C~o., (Cal.) 43 Pac. 457, 
the men1ora.ndlun, so far as materia1l here, was as follows: 
''I will deliver f.o.b. cars at Denver, Co~o, you 
to pay the freight, and deduct it frolll the pur-
chase price, forty thousand ($40,000) dry red 
spruce ties 6% to 8 inches thick, 6 to 9 inch face, 
8 foot long, sawed ends, 15 p·er cent to be 5 to 6 
inch face, tjes to be 60 cents each, and culls 40 
cents eaeh. Dry and green white spruc-e same di-
Inensions as above, 50 cents each. Red ·S·pruce ties 
in ~ets at $20.00 per thousand foo1: board 
~ ' 1neasure. 
Says the eourt: 
''The circumstance that the· nUmber 40,000 
is mentioned concurrently with the specification of 
red spruce ties does not operate to aid the con-
tract and render i~t valid. The contract is to be 
taken as an entiretv and indivisible, and "\Vhat-
ever it contains must be taken to be parts of one 
and the same thing, and we must, from all its 
terms, be able to conclude what the p~arties had 
agreed respecting each mentioned item. Scott v. 
Railway Co., 12 l\1ees. & W. 31; Baker v. Higgins, 
21 N.Y. 397; Clark v. Baker, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 452. 
* * * Al'l agree that the terms of the bargain 
rnust be so stated as to render it possible there-
front to gather \vhat the parties haYe agreed to. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
Tested by this very general rule, whi~h is suf-
ficient for our purpose, a simple inspect1o~ ?f the 
1nemorandum will den1onstrate its insufficiency. 
We are _unadvised by i~ts terms what number of 
ties of the various descriptions were agreed to be 
delivered by the eontracting p·arty. If the 40,000 is 
referable only to the red spruce ties, then the 
agreement is absolutely silent as to what the 
parties contracted respecting the dry and green 
white spruce, and the culls or the sets or the 
lumber. If the number is to be taken as app[icable 
to all rthe different varieties, we cannot ascertain 
what part of' each the parties contracted for. There 
is the same difficulty with respect to the number 
of switch sets which were to be furnished, the 
number of culls_ which were to be delivered, and 
the an1ount of lumber which Dell was to supply. 
There was no agreement to supply a certain defi-
nit.e thing, or a certain number of articles of a 
particular description of the various sorts speci-
fied, nor did the railroad company agree to accept 
specific articles of a given number or quantity. 
If the company had brought suit against De11 for 
the specific performance of the contract, it would 
have found insuperable difficulty to furnish a 
basis on which the court could decree a perform-
ance. Under these circumstances, the other p-arty 
must be subject to a like difficulty when he brings 
an aetion to recover damages for a failure to per-
form." . 
''A writing which does not specify the kind, 
quality or quantity of the prop·erty sold is in-
sufficient. A general description of an article 
which may include several different kinds to-
gether with a s_tatement of the qua.n~tity or number 
sold, is insufficient.'' 27 C. J. 27 4. · 
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2. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN 
E\"IDENC~E ~'EXHIBIT B.'' Rec. 86.) 
Said "Exhibit B" (the acceptance) is conditional and 
not identical with the offer. 
If, ho,vever, not,vithstanding the omission to specify 
therein the property described in the complaint or to 
identify any particular property, and if notwithstand-
ing it does not, in terms, commit defendant to a pro-
posal to · · buy'' anything from the respondent-if not-
withstanding these defects-"Exhibit A" can, by any 
possible construction, be held to constitute an offer to 
buy, no contract was entered into, because there was 
no acceptance. By ''Exhibit B, '' relied on as the accept-
ance, respondent attempted to do just what the buyer 
attempted to do in the Lewis-Elliott Bay Logging Com-
pany case. It attempted to make certain that which was 
uncertain, by the statement: 
"In accordance your cable Hawaiian Equip-
ment Company sells you subject delivery from 
surplus approximately 992 chip·pitng hammers, 
1836 scaling ha1nme.rs * * * f.o.b. Honolulu." 
(Italics ours.) 
Respondent could not by using the word ''sells'' thereby 
import into the words "bid maximum" an offer to buy, 
or by specifying the number of each kind of hammer, 
make such specification a part of the '' memor,andum in 
writing of the cont.ract," (Exhibit A) which is the only 
writing signed by appellant and by which appellant 
could be bound. By ''Exhibit B, '' r·espondent attempts 
to amp1ify "Exhibit A," which is not permissible. It can-
not be resorted to to supply deficiencies in ''Exhibit 
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A.'' But even by· ''·Exhibit B '' none of the models or 
makes, or the q:uality of e'ach kind, of hainmer set forth 
in the complaint are mentioned. It does not constitute any 
proof of the alleged contract for the sale and purchase 
of the particular property described in the complaint. 
'Furthermore, again ·assuming that ''Exhibit A'' was 
an ''offer;" "Exhibit B" did not constitute an accept-
anc-e because it was not an unconditional acceptance. The 
statement: 
''Hawaiian Equipment Company sells sub-
.iect to delivery from su.rpltts." (Italics ours.} 
undertakes to obligate respondent only on condition that 
delivery can be made or obtained from surplus. Suppose 
after the ·exchange of cablegrams respondent had de-
clined to deliver any hammers on the ground that there 
was no ''delivery from surplus,'' ( ·w·hatever those '\Vords 
mean), and ~uppose appellant had undertaken to re-
cover for respondent's breach of the contract in fail-
ing to deliver the goods, could appellant have recovered f 
Obviously not. Respondent would have claimed that its 
response was not an acceptance but, because of the con-
dition, was nothing more than a counter offer which had 
not been accepted by appellant, and that theTe never had 
been a meeting of minds. An acceptance must in no re-
spect he at variance with the offer, but must be identical 
with it and must be unconditional. As stated in 13 C.J. 
281: 
''An acceptance to be effectual must be iden-
tical '\Yi th the offer and uncondi tiona!. Where a 
person offers to do a definite thing and another 
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into tl1e acceptance, his answer is either a mere 
expression of ""il'lingness to treat .or i,t js a kin.d 
of proposal and in neither case is 1there 'an agree-
lllent. '' 
The following are a few examp1es: 
.,,..,.here an offer was of the unexpired term of a lease 
and the acceptance \Vas ''subject to obtaining the assent 
of the lessor.'' Putrnan v. Grace, ( :n1:ass.) 37 N .. E. 16·6. 
Where offer was to sell coke tins at a certain p·rice 
and the acceptance \Vas by a telegram stating·: ''We ac-
cept your offer if full \Veight plates.'' Kirwan v. Byrne, 
27 N.Y.S. 143. 
Offer to sell land accepted "provided title ~s per~ 
feet. Corcora.n v. White, (Ill.) 7 N. E .. 5.25. 
An acceptance of an offer to sell crude oil at 15° 
gravity with a.ded stipulation that it must be of that 
gravity at 60° farenheit' '·does not create a binding con-
tract. Fo1tr Oil Co. v. United Oil Prod!ucers, (Cal.) 79 
Pac. 366. 
An acceptance of an offer to sell land conditioned on 
approval of title by purchasers' attorney. Richa,rdson v. 
Warehouse Co., (N.C.) 26 S. E. (2d) 897. 
Offer to sell land accepted with demand of delivery 
of "good and sufficient title." Larndrum v. Jordan, · 
(Okla.) 229 P·ac. 182. Flog·el v. Dowling, (Ore.) 102 Pac. 
178. 
An acceptance by seller, of offer to buy which stipu-
lates that .prop·erty is sold ''subject to passageway rights, 
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:party wall agre.ements etc." Lawrence v. Rosenberg, 
(~!ass.) 130 N. E.l89. 
An offer to sell ice which does not specify time of 
payment contemplates .payment on delivery, and an ac-
ceptance : ''Will take the ice ; commence loading Mon-
day. Will weigh and setfle promptly'' is not an uncon-
ditional acceptance. Rogers v. French, (Iowa.) 96 N. W. 
787. 
See also Bell Clothes Shop v. Kamber, 197 N.Y.S. 
244. 
In Edwards v. Schaw·no, 247 N.W. 465, the seller 
telegraphed to the buyer an offer to sell ''one thousand 
hags of po,vdered mille'' The buyer telegraphed accept-
ance but added that the milk was to be of" first quality." 
At the trial there was testimony introduced to the effect 
that in a 1ong distance telephone negotiation preceding 
the telegrams of offer and acceptance, it was under-
stood that the quality of the milk was to be "first class." 
The court said : 
"Undisputed evidence of correspondence and 
telegran1s held to show no enforceable contract 
for sale of milk powder (St. 1931, Sec. 121.04 (1). 
" .... t\fter defendant's offer to sell, plaintiff 
made counter offers· which were not accepted by 
defendant, and the negotiations, therefore never 
ripened into an enforceable contract; ' 
''Purported acceptance of offer to sell add-
ing qualifications, amounted to counter-off~r and 
did not complete contract.'' 
' ' 
It is also p-ertinent to remark that there is nothing 
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in the '• memorandum • * • signed by the party to be 
charged, indicating· that it had any understanding of 
\vhat \Yas intended by ''delivery fron1 surplus.'' If the 
1ueaning of these \vords might have been shown by parol 
they could not be injected into the ''memorandum'' to 
1nake it read that appellant offered to buy "if resp~on.dent 
could secu.re delirery from surplus.'' Furthermore, 
·'Exhibit B'' states that respondent'' sells approximately 
992 'chipping' hammers and 1836 scaling ham1ners. '' 
Does such language constitute an unconditional response to 
the 'vords of "Exhibit .. A .. "when "Exhibit A" says nothing 
about ''chipping'' hammers and does not specify what 
quantity appellant offers to buy, or use any words from 
which, without parol evidence, the number of hammers 
of each kind could be determined~ ·The meaning of the 
words ''Will take all'' is so uncertain as to require parol 
evidence, which is not permis~ible. 
There is yet another reason why there was no con-
tract in this case. ''Exhibit A'' fixes maximum price 
''Honolulu." "Exhibit B" says "f .. o.b. Honolulu." Free 
on board what~ "Exhibit A" says nothing about "f.o. b." 
If appeliant intended to accept delivery at Honolulu, not 
free on board any transportation line, which is the only 
construction that can be placed upon the word ''Hono-
lulu,'' and if respondent had placed the merchandise 
on board some line of its own choosing and a loss oc-
curred, would appellant have sustained such loss, when 
it had not specified f.o.b. in its so-called offer~ The un-
certainty about delivery is clearly apparent from ''Ex-
hibit D '' for the respondent 8tates therein: 
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''we are doing everYthing possible to move 
this equipment to you as soon as possib'le. . 
Our presu'mp~tion is you want it sent to E1mco 
Corporation, Salt Lake City.'' (Italics ours.) 
Nothing in "Exhibit A" suggesting shipment to Salt 
Lake City. Nothing more than delivery at Honolulu can 
be read into "Exhibit A." Respondent also says in "Ex-
hibit B:" 
''We consider this exchange of cables above 
mentioned and this confirming letter the equiva-
lent of delivery.'' 
Why? Beacuse respondent realized it had no authority to 
make delivery f.o.b. any line, and as no place of delivery 
in Honolulu was specified by appellant, respondent at-
ten1pted to declare a sort of constructive de1livery. The 
uncertainty as to the quantity of tools is likewise ap-
parent from "Exhibit D," for respondent states: 
''Will give you final account of exact num-
ber of tools shipped." 
There had been, of course, no written contract whereby 
appellant bound itself to buy the number to be thus as-
certained by the final account or to buy the particular 
nu1nbers, names and n1odels alleged in the comp:laint or 
any specified number or kind. There had been no num-
ber ascertained when ''Exhibit B'' \vas sent (respondent 
used the word "approximately") or when the "mem-
orandum'' was signed, and resort to parol would have 
been necessary to explain the meaning of ''Win take all.'' 
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This is not a case in which appellant welched from 
a bargain, as respondent attempts to establish. It is 
rather a case \Vhere respondent attempted to fasten on 
appellant an obligation which it was never appellant's 
intention to assume. When respondent received the cable 
''bid maximum," with what haste it replied: "Hawaiian 
Equipn1ent Company sells you'' etc., not property re-
spondent ow"ned; not property which had been seggre-
gated or identified; not property, the quantity of which 
had been detern1ined (quantity was to be determined on 
final account-See "Exhibit D"), but property which 
respondent intended to acquire. However, respondent 
played safe. If it obtained the property, it wou1d insist 
there was a sale, make a large profit above what the 
government was quoting the price of hammers. (See 
"Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 5".) If it did not obtain the prop-
erty, it could say: ''Our response to your offer was that 
we sold you subject to delivery f,om surplus;'' therefore, 
we only obligated ourselves conditionally. 
From May 16, 1946, the Surplus Property Office of 
the Department of Interior in Honolulu had advertised 
to the public these hammers for sale at fixed prices of 
$18.00 for chippers and $15.00 for sca~ers. (See Exhibit 
3). Anyone could have bought them through June, July 
and August at these prices. This, Hawaiian Equipment 
Company did not disclose to Eimco. 
Horeover, on August 5, 1946, the Surplus Property 
Office op·ened these goods to negotiated sale for prices 
other _than· the foregoing fixed prices. (See Exhibits 4 
and 5). It was in this situation that Hawaiian Equip-
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ment hurried over to Surplus and bought for the fixed 
prices of $18.00 and $15.00 (See Exhibit 1), and then 
sent ''Exhibit B'' attempting to thrust upon Eimco a 
contract to buy them at '$24.00 and $17.50; whereas, 
Eimco thought they were instructing Hawaiian Equip-
ment Company to bid for Eimco and to get the goods as 
cheaply as possible. 
This action smacks of bad faith when respondent so 
precipitately attempted by "Exhibit B'' to absolutely 
bind appellant to buy while only conditionally binding 
itself to sell and deliver. Did not the words ''bid maxi-
mum,'' suggest something different from" offer to buy1" 
How easy it would have been by further exchange of 
cablegrams for respondent to make definite and certain 
just what appellant intended rather than to hastily reply 
to the cable "bid maximum," "Ha-\vaiian Equipment 
Company sells." "Exhibit B'' is an acknowledgment that 
"Exhibit A" did not say enough. If it clearly contained 
an offer to buy, respondent could have replied: "Your 
offer accepted." But with intent to commit appellant to a 
sale and to make certain the kind of a contract to which 
it wished to bind appellant, respondent cabled: "Hawai-
ian Equipment Company sells,'' and then it hedges with 
the words "subject delivery from surplus." It is too 
apparent from Exhibits A and B that there never was a 
valid contract between the parties. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING· IN 
E'TJDENCE "EXHIBIT C." (Rec. 86.) 
This exhibit could not possibly constitute a part 
of the contract. It is not a part of respondent's so-called 
acceptance and was immaterial. 
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-!. THE COURT ERRED IN AD~IITTING IN 
E'"'IDENl~E '•EXHIBIT D" (Rec. 89). 
This letter does not purport to be a pa.rt of any 
contract, but i~ a mere confirnuzfi,on of the cablegrams 
between the parties after the so-called offer and accep-
tance had been transmitted. ''T e assun1e respondent will 
claim nothing 1nore for it. It could not, of course, aid or 
amplify the insufficient '• nz.emoravndurn'' or in any way 
bind appellant by its explanations about the necessity for 
making a ''physical count'' of the hammers or about 
•' ~teamer space," or respondent's "presumption'' or by 
the statement that appellant's "purchase of this equip-
ment was on an f.o.b. Honolulu basis." Neither could 
appellant be bound by respondent's statement that it 
considered the cablegrams and the letter (Exhibit D) 
"the equivalent of delivery.'' If no contract resulted 
from '·Exhibits A and B," "Exhibit D" was not com-
petent to create one. Said exhibit was immaterial for it 
could in no wise constitute a part of the so-called con-
tract, all the terms of which were required to be embodied 
in some written memorandum'' signed by the party t'O be 
charged.'' This exhibit was, therefore, improperly ad-
mitted. 
5. THE COURT ER.RED IN REFU·SING· TO 
DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE APPEL·LANT AND 
IN REFUSING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MO·TION 
FOR NEW ·TRIAL. (Rec. 326, 62.) 
These assigned errors go to the same question as 
the errors in admitting in evidence ''Exhibits A and B '' 
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and also to the question of the insufficiency of the evi-
d€nce to sustain the verdict, one of the grounds of the 
motion for new trial. 
If ''Exhibits A and B'' were improperly admitted, 
of course, plaintiff had no case and the authorities we 
have cited support that contention. Without these ex-
hibits or even with them, there was likewise a failure 
' ' 
to prove the allegations of the -complaint .. Se-c. 104-14-2, 
U.C.A. contains, among others, the provision: 
' 'Where * * * the allegation of the claim * * • 
to which proof is directed is unproved, not in some 
particular or particulars only but in its general 
scope and meaning, it is not to be deemed a case 
of variance, but a fai'lure of proof." 
We again make refei~ence to the allegations of the 
complaint: 
"That plaintiff and defendant entered into 
an agreement in writing as follows: tha,t on or 
about August 8, 1946, the defen~ant offe.red and 
agree-d to purchase from plailntiff, and on or ~about 
A1tgttst 9, 1946, the plaimtiff accepl;,e:d said offer 
and iagr~eed t;o sell to defenda-nt certain goods 
kno,vn and designated as pvneurY/)(})tw scaling ham-
Tilers and chipping hammers for ~the price and 
upon the terms and conditions hereinafter al-
leged." (Italics ours.) 
Then follows a specification of the quantities, n1odels 
and makes of scaling hamn1ers and a like sp-ecification as 
to chipping ha1nmers. . 
If, as we have shown, respondent must neeessarly 
rely on "Exhibit A'' as the "me1no-randum in u,rif:intf 
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of the co·ntract * * * signed by the pa1·ty to be charged" 
for proof of a.ll the tern1s of the eontract., of cour:se, it 
is a.ppa.rent that said h Exhibit .A." is no proof whatever 
of the contract alleged in the complaint. The contract 
alleged is not proved even if ·'Exhibit B'' could be 
resorted to to arnplify "Exhibit A", which is not per-
Inissible. Even with said Exhibits, there is a complete 
failure of proof. Without them, if the court erred in 
admitting them, respondent has not the semblance of a 
ca.se, for said exhibits are insufficient as an offer (''mem-
orandum in writing of the contract") or as an accept-
ance, and therefore, there was no contract. It obviously 
is unnecessary to further argue so self-evident a proposi-
tion. 
THERE 'VAS NO ~IEE·TING OF ~fiNDS 
There is however, yet another reason why the court 
erred in refusing appellant's motion for a directed ver-
dict and in overruling appellant's motion for new trial. 
The evidence affirmatively shows there was no contract 
because there was no meeting of minds on what was in-
tended hy the cablegram, "Exhibit A". The words "hid 
maximum'' are clearly indicative of an authorization of 
plaintiff to bid for and on behalf of 'defendant, as stated 
by Joseph Rosenblatt. He testified: 
Q. Did you tell, did you Mr. Rosenblatt, in that 
conversation, tell, in the last conversation 
with Mr. B1ades and l\{acNaughton, tell them 
you were buying fron1 them~ 
A. I did not tell them I was buying from them. 
They didn't offer me anything. 
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Q. What did you tell them~ 
A. I told them we would get a bid 'vhich they 
could submit to surplus." (Rec. 260) (See also 
Rec. 234.) 
If, for the sake of argument we assume that re-
spondent, in good faith interpreted the cablegram as an 
offer to buy (which we regard as an entirely erroneous 
interpretation), this is proof of its ambiguity. The minds 
of the parties did not n1eet and there was, therefore, 
no contract, and the court, as a rna tter of law, should 
have so held. The applicable rule of law is that when 
the parties have a different understanding as to the 
meaning of ambiguous language, or of language which 
may be given more than one construction, there is no 
contract, since the minds of the parties have not n1et. 
In his treatise on Contracts, Williston states the 
rule as follows: 
''Though it is true that a party to a con-
tract is bound by his express language, and can-
not contradict the meaning of his words by deny-
ing that he intended this meaning, he is not bound 
by the interpretation which may be placed on am-
biguous language unless he was himself blame-
worthy in permitting the ambiguity, or even then 
if the other party to the transaction is equally 
b1an1eworthy in not detecting the ambiguity. If 
every word and every act had but one permissible 
meaning, it -vvould never be necessary in consider-
ing the formation of contracts to inquire into the 
intent of the speaker or actor; but since this is 
not the case, if an expression, in view of the cir-
cumstances under which it was used, may fairly 
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1nean either of two things, each party is a.t liberty 
to attach his own meaning, at least unless he was 
in son1e "~ay responsible for the other party' Inis-
take. This result has been summarized in the ·R.e-
stateinent of Contracts: (Sec. 71). 
" 'Except as stated in Sees. 55, 70, the un-
disclosed understanding of either party of the 
n1eaning of his O\Vll words and other a0ts, or of the 
n1eaning of the other party's words and other acts 
is n1aterial in the formation of contracts in the 
follo,ving cases and in no others : 
" · (a) If the manifes~tations of intention of 
either party are uncertain or ambiguous, and he 
has no reason to know that they may bear a dif-
ferent meaning to the other party from that which 
he hin1self attaches to them, his n1anifestations 
are operative in the formation of a contract only 
in the event that the other party attaches to ~them 
the same meaning. 
'' '(b) If both parties know or have reason 
to kno" ... that the manifestations of one of them are 
uncertain or ambiguous and the parties attach 
different 1neanings to the manifestations, this dif-
ference prevents the uncertain or ambiguous mani-
festations from being operative as an offer or an 
acceptance. 
'' ' (c) If either party knows that the other 
does not intend what his words or other acts ex-
press, this knowledge prevents such words or 
other act from being operative as an offer or an 
acceptance.' 
''Such an error in ~anguage may relate ~to 
the object to which the apparent agreement re-
lates, to the p·erson with whom it was made, or 
to any of its terms." Willison on C-ontracts, 298-
301. 
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See Anson on Contracts, p. 156; Williston on Sales. 
Sec. 5; 12 Am. Jur., p. 518, (Sec. 21 Contracts); Holmes, 
The Common Law, p. 309; 6 Eng. Ruling Cases, p. 200-
201; Pollock on Contracts, pp. 504, 505; Pomeroy on 
Contracts, Sec. 251 ; Kerr on Fraud and 1\listake, 5th 
Ed. pp. 548, 549 and cas·es cited. 
The famous leading case on the point is the early 
case of Raffles v. WichelhatUs (1864), 2 H & C 906. There 
the parties supposedly agreed for a charter party "Ex 
Peerless" to sail from Bombay to England. It subse-
quently hecame apparent that there were two ships named 
Peerless, one of which sailed from Bombay to England 
in October, the other which sailed in December. One of 
the parties had contracted with reference to the ship 
having the early sailing date, the other in good faith 
kne"r only of the latter. The court held that since each 
party \Vas mistaken as to what the other party believed, 
and inasmuch as there was a latent ambiguity in the 
alleged agreement, each was entitled to insist upon his 
oV\rn interpretation of the agreement, and neither could 
enforce the contract against the other. There "\Vas no 
nteeting of the minds and hence nothing for the court 
to enforce. The principle of this case has been followed 
repeatedly by English and American courts. The facts 
in this case are repeated as an illustration to Sec. 71 
of the Restatement, and the case itself has been repeat-
edly cited and followed by text 'vriters and judges in 
this country. 
Another fan1ous case is Falck v. Williams (1900) 
Appeal Cases 176. Here plaintiff and defendant had 
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been engaged in an exchange of messages in code through 
a third person acting as broker. A eypher telegra1n wa.s 
sent "Tithout punctuation as an alleged acceptance of 
previous offers. The meaning of the telegram depended 
upon whether one particular word was read with the 
'vords that preceded or followed it. Interpreted one 
way the co.:rmnunication referred to a shipment of shale 
fron1 Sidney to Barcelona; the other interpretation had 
reference to shipping· copra from Fiji to Europe. The 
parties differed in their interpretation and the court 
held that since there 'vas no reason why one meaning 
'vas more certain than the other, and since in good faith 
the sa1ne a.1nbiguous language could reasonably be inter-
preted in two different 'vays, there was no contract . 
.. A.1nerican decisions are squarely in line with R1ajfles 
v. Wichelhaus, supra. In Cile v. Cavanagh (1869), 103 
Mass. 356, 4 Am. Rep. 560, there was an agreement 
for the sale of a certain lot on ''Prospect Street, Walt-
ham." There were two streets in \Valtham known as 
Prospect Street. The jury was instructed that if the 
parties had in mind different streets there could be no 
contract and the app·ellate court affirmed the decision. 
In Wiwnemucoa Watetr and Light C:ompamy v. Moihel 
Gas Engine Works, (1913), 179 Ind. 542, 101 N.E. 1007, 
an action was brought to recover part of th·e purchase 
price on a contract for the sale of an engine from 
appellee to app·ellant, and for damages for alleged breach 
of guarantee. Among the specifications of the engine 
was the following: ''Horse power develop,ed at 275 
R.P.M. 150 actual horse power." It appear·ed that only 
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as high as 125 horse power \Vas attained a.t the place 
where performance was expected. Plaintiff claimed that 
150 horse power working efficiency was guaranteed; 
defendant claimed that the guaranteHd horse power was 
subject to the deductions of loss of horse power from 
friction, and that it was so understood in the trade. The 
court held, as to the meeting of the minds, 
''If it (the case) resolved itself into the situa-
tion that one of the parties means and intends 
one thing, and the other party means and intends 
another, it is manifest that the first element of 
a contract, the mutual meeting of the minds of the 
parties is lacking·, and there is no contract.'' 
In Indiana Ft~Jel and Supply Company v. Indianapolis 
Basket Company, 41 Ind. Appeals 658, 84 N.E. 776, 
'vhich was a suit on an alleged agreement for the sale 
of a certain kind of coal described as ''Indiana Egg,'' 
the offeror thought the coal was to be screened only 
once; the offeree expected that it was to be screened 
t\vice. Both interpretations were reasonable, since the 
two kinds of coal were both kno\vn to the industry by 
the same name. Held, there was no contract hecause·the 
language used was susceptible to two meanings. 
In Mum1nerhojf v. Ra1nda.ll, 19 Ind. Appeals 44, 
40 N.E. 40, the stenographer of an alleged offeror made 
an error in transcribing and the offeree thought the 
"Triter \vas offering to sell potatoes at 35c pe-r bushel 
instead of 55c, as the former dictated. The court held 
there was no contract, since there was no meeting of 
n1inds. 
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In Cage r. Black, ~l7 .A.rk. 613, 134 B.\:v. 942, defen-
dant offeretl plaintiff 200 ~arks of rice ~ '$5.75 FOB.'' 
Plaintiff understood the price "Tas per sack. Defendant 
nnder~tood that the p-rice "'"as per barrel. There was 
evidence that both measures 'vere used in the trade. 
Held there \Vas no contract. In this case, however, the 
court decided that when the plaintiff accepted the rice 
after learning of defendant's intention, a contract came 
into being at that time upon the terms understood by 
lefendant. 
In Sn.oderly c. Bower, 30 Ida. 484, 166 Pac. 265, a 
written agreement provided that certain hay was to be 
measured according to the ''Government Rule.'' Held, 
that evidence could be introduced to disclose the fact 
that there were several rules known as the "Government 
Rule,'' and that the parties did not intend the same 
thing, and that inasmuch as the minds of the parties 
did not intend the same thing, and that inasmuch a.s 
the minds of the p~arties did not meet as to what '' Gov-
ernment Rule" was to be employed, no contract existed. 
In a ~finnesota case, X showed plaintiff a lot which 
he told plaintiff that defendant wanted to sell. The lot 
X showed to plaintiff was in fact not owned by defen-
dant, although it was on the same street as another lot 
which defendant did own. X was simply mistaken as 
to the identity of the lot. Plaintiff and defendant agreed 
orally for the sale of a lot, each referring to a different 
one. Held, no contract existed since the minds of the 
parties never met. Citing Raffles v. Wichelhaus, supra, 
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and Gile v. Cavanagh, supra. Strong v. Lane (1896), 
66 Minn. 94, 68 N.W. 765. 
In P~e~rless Glass C·ompany v. Crockett Tinware Co., 
(Cal.), 54 Pac. 101, the seller giving terms stated that 
the ''freight allowance'' was 7 4c under the belief that 
he was answering an inquiry concerning the freight rates. 
The buyer understood the term to mean an allowance 
of 7 4c per 100 pounds from the invoice price. The 
California Suprem·e Court held that the buyer was not 
entitled to any reduction, there having been no contract 
because of the failure of the meeting of the minds of the 
parties. 
In Tyng v. C·onstwnt-Loraine Inv. Co., 47 Utah 330, 
the plaintiff in good faith believed he was contracting 
to buy, and to receive a warranty deed for, a lot on 
State Street in Salt Lake City 55 x 165 feet. Defendant 
intended to sell 53lf2 x 165 feet by warranty and 10 x 16'5 
feet by quit-claim deed. Plaintiff sought return of 
$1000.00 paid by him on the purchase price and asked 
the court to instruct the jury that if they found there 
was a misunderstanding between the parties and no 
meeting of minds, then there 'vas no contract and de-
fendant should return the monev. The trial court refused 
oJ 
to submit this question to the jury, and for that reason 
the case 'vas reversed. Says the court: 
"As to the plaintiff's understanding of the 
ambiguity, and in what sense he regarded the con-
tract, there are two views : One is, that ht under-
stood and regarded it in the sense that the defend-
ant unders,tood it and as tendering by its con-
veyance, whatever property was owned by it on 
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the '"e~t ~ide of State Street. If so, then the 1ninds 
of the parties met; then did the difendant tender 
a deed in accordance "Ti th the agreement; and 
then """as there no breach and no obligation to re-
turn the $1,000. The other vie"' is, that the plain-
tiff understood the a1nbiguity to Inean a convey-
ance by 'varranty of fifty-feet. If so, then the 
n1inds of the parties did not meet; then was there 
no contract; and then was the plaintiff entitled 
to a return of the $1,000 paid by him, not on the 
theory of any breach of contract, bu~t of money 
had and received. '' 
Upon the retrial, the issue of whether the minds of 
the parties met \Vas submitted and the jury found for 
the plaintiff. On the next appeal (50 Utah 1, 8) this 
court remarked: 
''If, as the jury found, the minds of the par-
ties did not meet upon soine essential elements, 
then it must follow that no contract was entered 
into by the parties, and hence the defendant re-
tains the $1000.00 of p1aintiff's money without 
right or authority of la,v.'' 
It is not difficult to apply the rule in these cases 
to the case at bar. The words "bid maximum" can, 
and we think ought to he interpreted to mean "you bid 
maximum on our behalf," and that is what appellant 
meant (Se.e Rec. 2'60.) Respondent, we think, erroneous-
ly, interpreted the words to mean ''defendant bids,'' 
disregarding the word ''maximum.'' Therefore, it affir-
matively appears from the evidence that there was no 
meeting of minds. 
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~fay we in conclusion summarize: 
(a) If there is an enforceable eon tract in this case, 
it u1ust be found in the two cablegra1ns, ExhibitR A and 
B. Defendant's cablegram, Exhibit A, "~as sent August 
7, 1946, plaintiff's, Exhibit B, on August 9, 1946, and 
these cablegrams constitute the alleged ''agreement in 
writing" and are the alleged offer and acceptance refer-
red to i~ paragraph 2 of the complaint. (Rec. p. 1). 
There is no '' 1nemorandun1'' other than Exhibit A signed 
by appellant and as before stated, the sale involves 
goods of a value in excess of $500.00. 
(b) The "memorandum" must set forth an offer 
to buy. It does not do so. The statement of the offer 
to buy must be so clearly expressed as to exclude an 
interpretation that any other than an offer to purchase 
is intended. It must not be subject to the construction 
that it is an instruction to respondent to bid, on behalf 
of appellant, for property offered for sale by the gov-
ernment. ''Exhibit A'' does not meet this test, for its 
phraseology clearly implies an authorization to respon-
dent to bid on behalf of appellant, and to obtain the 
property (without specification) as cheaply as possible, 
but in no event to bid above the maxin1um prices stated. 
The term ''bid maximum'' bear~ no other reasonable 
construction. Appellant did not cable: "bid" or "offer"; 
it cabled "bid maxin1urn". The vvord "maximum" can-
not be disregarded in this, a commercial transaction. 
(c) The '' n1emorandum'' lacks certainty as to the 
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property involved. It contains no description of the 
quantities, 1nodels or n1akes alleged in the -c(nnplaint or 
any quantities, n1a.kes or Inodel.s .. 
(d) Even if "Exhibit ... :\." 1s an offer (which we 
_deny), the alleged acceptance "Exhibit B" is not an 
unconditional, but a conditional acceptance, ''on delivery 
of property from surplus.'' 
(e) \'Exhibit B'' attempts to amplify and to inject 
new tern1s by specifying (approximately) the number 
of each kind of hammer importing the word'' pneumatic'' 
and the word "chipping" when appellant had used no 
such terms. 
(f) Even if "Exhibit A" is an off,er, "Exhibit B" 
attempts to inject a new term by the statement ''f.o.h. 
Honolulu'' when no such proposal was included in or 
justified by "Exhibit A". 
(g) Appellant asserts that "Exhibit A'' is not an 
offer to buy and that it could not, in good faith be~ tso 
regarded. If however, the court should hold that it could 
be so construed, we contend that it is also subject to being 
construed as an authorization to bid on behalf of a:ppel-
lant and being ambiguous and appellant intending one 
thing and respondent in good faith (if it acted in good 
faith) intending another, th~re was no meeting of minds 
and therefore no contract. 
We respectfully submit that the motion for directed 
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verdict should have· been sustained and that the judg-
ment should be reversed. 
Respectfully' submitted, 
WILLIS W. RITTER 
JESSE R. S. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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